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Abstract
This article argues that concept misformation and conceptual stretching undermine efforts to combine qualitative and 
quantitative methods in multimethod research (MMR). Two related problems result from the mismatch of qualitatively 
and quantitatively construed concepts. Mechanism muddling occurs when differences in the connotation of qualitatively 
and quantitatively construed concepts embed different causal properties into conceptual definitions. Conceptual 
slippage occurs when qualitatively and quantitatively construed concepts use incompatible nominal, ordinal, or radial 
scales. Instead of gaining leverage from the synthesis of large- and small-N analysis, these problems can push MMR in 
two diametrically opposed directions, emphasizing one methodological facet at the cost of the other.
Keywords
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In the classic “Concept Misformation in Comparative 
Politics,” Sartori (1970) argues that in the course of seek-
ing to describe the entire globe, core terms in the social 
scientific vocabulary, like democracy or development, 
are altered, diluted, or rendered vacuous. Instead of gain-
ing analytical leverage through more powerful techniques 
of comparison, social science is likely only to stumble 
into a morass of terminology so general as to be vague in 
applicability and meaning. Sartori’s warning were often 
invoked during the so-called “paradigm wars” between 
qualitative and quantitative researchers in social sciences 
in the 1970s and 1980s (Bryman 2006; Teddlie and 
Tashakkori 2009, 14-16; Guba and Lincoln 2005). Fortu-
nately, many of these now stale debates have given way 
to a more pluralistic vision of inter- and intramethodolog-
ical dialogue. Interpretivism, which favors more reflex-
ive and ideographic case studies, now stands alongside 
nomothetically oriented qualitative and quantitative work 
(Sil 2000; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006). For those 
aspiring to develop generalizable theory, partnership 
between qualitative and quantitative methods is a new 
norm and multimethod research (MMR) an increasingly 
prominent technique.
This article argues, though, that in combining qualita-
tive and quantitative methods, MMR often overlooks 
important questions about concepts and measurement. 
Different forms of concept misformation undermine 
MMR’s two-pronged effort to increase the comprehen-
siveness and validity of causal accounts in theory building 
and theory testing. Two related but distinct problems are 
identified: The first problem is mechanism muddling. 
Differences between definitions used in qualitative and 
quantitative versions of concepts embed different causal 
properties into those definitions. This problem tends to 
arise as qualitative techniques are used to identify specific 
attributes of cases that are necessary for the enactment of 
specific mechanisms or causal pathways. These attributes 
are not, however, necessarily present in every case identi-
fied in the quantitatively construed domain. The result is 
that even though a consistent correlational pattern is iden-
tified, the mechanisms connecting antecedent with out-
come remain underspecified and relate to only a subset of 
the larger domain of relevant cases. The second problem is 
conceptual slipping. This arises when different taxonomi-
cal schemas are used to organize what purports to be the 
same concept, typically as qualitative methods array cases 
in nominal categories while quantitative methods array 
them along ordinal or radial axes. This leads to analytical 
ambiguity, as some cases are categorized as equivalent in 
the qualitative sphere but different in the quantitative 
sphere and vice versa, making it extremely difficult to 
generate valid generalization. Instead of leading to the 
synthesis of qualitative and quantitative methods in MMR, 
attempts to mitigate these problems push MMR in two 
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opposing directions. On one hand, addressing conceptual 
slippage requires standardization of concepts across the 
quantitative and qualitative domain. On the other hand, 
addressing mechanism muddling requires greater concep-
tual flexibility to capture the variety of equifinite mecha-
nisms leading to the same ultimate result.
To illustrate the hazards of concept misformation and 
suggest some solutions, the article examines three recent 
books that deploy MMR designs, Schultz’s (2001) 
Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy, Lieberman’s 
(2003) Race and Regionalism in the Politics of Taxation 
in Brazil and South Africa, and Lange’s (2009) Lineages 
of Despotism and Development: British Colonialism and 
State Power. These works break significant ground meth-
odologically and substantively, and each has garnered 
considerable scholarly recognition. The goal is not to 
impugn them but rather to argue a fortiori that if they 
overlook problems stemming from conceptual misforma-
tion, then these challenges are likely common to the ven-
ture of MMR as a whole.
Concept Misformation  
and the Commensurability 
Problem in MMR
Sartori raised the problem of concept misformation in the 
midst of a veritable revolution in social science method-
ology, with the widespread adoption of quantitative, sta-
tistical techniques and new commitment to positivism 
and the elucidation of universal laws of social science. 
Sartori warned that the idiom of quantitative, statistical 
metrics was often vacuous and thus ill suited as a means 
to development and to express such theories.  Using the 
metaphor of the “ladder of abstraction,” Sartori high-
lighted the interplay of two dimensions in concept forma-
tion: intension (connotation), the systematic and explicit 
definition of the characteristics of the concept, and exten-
sion (denotation), the range of cases that can be catego-
rized as meeting the conceptual definition. Intension and 
extension are inversely related. On one hand, moving up 
the ladder of abstraction by increasing a concept’s exten-
sion incorporates more cases and strips away some of its 
necessary intension or its specific conceptual attributes. 
On the other hand, moving down the ladder of abstraction 
by adding to a concept’s intension means that it will 
describe fewer empirical cases because it adds to the cri-
teria necessary to be judged as an instance of the linguis-
tic term under consideration. Sartori used the terms 
stretching and straining to describe the process by which 
specific connotation is jettisoned in the course of extend-
ing denotation. When strained or stretched, conceptual 
terms cover more by saying less about the objects to 
which they refer (Sartori 1970, 1041).
Connotation and denotation are alternate sides of the 
same coin. While Collier and Goertz point out some 
important exceptions to Sartori’s claim about the inverse 
relationship of connotation and denotation (most notably 
in the case of family-resemblance-type as opposed to 
necessary/sufficient-type concepts), the core of Sartori’s 
contention about concepts remains intact.1 An argument 
about whether or not to include a specific case in an anal-
ysis relates ultimately to the conceptual definition used to 
delineate criteria for inclusion under an abstract rubric. 
Disputes over selecting cases and establishing a referent 
domain necessarily imply ambiguity in the key terms of 
the concepts. Conversely, vagueness in the key terms 
implicates an imprecise delineating of referent cases 
(Collier and Mahoney 1996). This goes to Sartori’s basic 
concern that concepts like democracy and political com-
munity might have their meanings distorted as they travel 
to cover new cases.
Sartori never suggested that qualitative and quantita-
tive methods are fundamentally incommensurate at an 
epistemological level. On the contrary, he pointed out 
that they can share a considerable amount of common 
ground, including the aspiration for broader theories of 
social change (at least as long as they both held to a 
positivist epistemology). The problem Sartori touched 
on is one of concept commensurability. Changes in the 
criteria relevant to taxonomical categorization of cases 
rendered different meanings to specific terms or con-
cepts, making their arguments incommensurate on a 
local scale. As Sankey (1991, 2000) elaborates, one of 
the key indicators of such a concept as incommensura-
bility is that referents included in one categorization 
scheme are excluded from another. Though they might 
share a term, they are talking about different objects 
because meanings of specific conceptual vocabularies 
not only vary but also are impossible to translate 
meaningfully.2
A number of scholars have recently sought to follow 
Sartori’s footsteps in offering a unified epistemological 
framework for qualitative and quantitative methodology. 
King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) set out to demonstrate a 
common toolkit for both methodologies. Collier and 
Brady (2004) reiterate the notion of shared standards even 
while they highlight the diverse practices. Techniques of 
“nested analysis”—sequential application of quantitative 
and qualitative methods on the same research puzzle—
seem to offer the best of both methods and are gaining 
increasing notoriety in political science (Coppedge 2005; 
Lieberman 2005; Fearon and Laitin 2008).
Nested analysis offers two primary and related justi-
fications for combining methods. The first is the idea 
that qualitative and quantitative methods offer comple-
mentary but distinctive forms of analysis that combine 
to offer a more comprehensive, multidimensional 
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causal account (Gerring, 2005, 2011; Mahoney 2008). 
As Mahoney and Goertz (2006, 231) observe,
an explanation of an outcome in one or a small 
number of cases leads one to wonder if the same 
factors are at work when a broader understanding 
of scope is adopted, stimulating a larger-N analysis 
in which the goal is less to explain particular cases 
and more to estimate average effects. Likewise, 
when the statistical results about the effects of 
causes are reported, it seems natural to ask if these 
results make sense in terms of the history of indi-
vidual cases, one wishes to try to locate the effects 
in specific cases.
This distinction leads to a division of labor between 
different methodological components. The quantitative, 
statistical portion identifies regular macro-level correla-
tive relationships. The qualitative, case study portion is 
used to infer what mechanistic processes connect ante-
cedent (X) and outcome (Y) variables (Pawson 1995; 
Erzberger and Prein 1997; Bryman 2004). Importantly, 
this perspective does not see mechanisms as mere hand-
maidens of correlation or yet-to-be-discovered interven-
ing variables but analytically distinct that entities that 
generate change directly (Waldner 2007, 154; Mahoney 
2001).
The second justification for MMR is to leverage such 
a multidimensional account to increase validity. This is 
one of the oldest justifications for MMR. Put simply, a 
hypothesis that survives a series of tests with different 
methods is more valid than a hypothesis tested with the 
help of only a single method (Erzberger and Kelle 2003, 
460; Denzin 1978; for a critique, see Reiss 2009). Failing 
the qualitative test prompts revision to the quantitative 
model and vice versa. Nesting or moving sequentially 
between qualitative and quantitative methods allows a 
check for spurious correlation and interrogate potential 
omitted variables qualitatively before integrating these 
new variables into the quantitative analysis for testing 
across a larger sample.
Although the techniques of nested analysis have been 
subject to methodological critique (Rohlfing 2007) and 
continued skepticism about the epistemological continu-
ity between the two methods (Ahmed and Sil 2009; 
Chatterjee 2009), few have grappled with the question of 
conceptual commensurability per se. Coppedge (2009, 
16), for one, cautions that “there is a flaw in any multi-
method work that relies on mismatched concepts—which 
probably includes most multimethod research.” This is a 
significant predicament. If qualitative and quantitative 
methods are talking about different things, then it is 
impossible for them to be saying the same things (Kelle 
2001). Seemingly concurrent findings can be dismissed 
as mere felicitous coincidence. Still, the question remains, 
how can the cases of conceptual mismatches be diag-
nosed and addressed? The sections below describe two 
distinct forms of concept misformation in MMR and ana-
lyze the implications of each for goals of confirming and 
complementary causal accounts.
From Conceptual Stretching to 
Mechanism Muddling
The possibility of conceptual stretching because of a 
mismatch between the concepts and variables used in the 
qualitative and quantitative setting has obvious perti-
nence for MMR. The concepts used in case-based, quali-
tative research tend to have complex or “thick” definitions 
developed iteratively through examination of a small 
number of cases. In contrast, the concepts used in vari-
able-oriented, quantitative research tend to be “thin,” 
with relatively simple conceptual definition. Conceptual 
thickness and thinness translate inversely into narrow-
ness or breadth at the level of extension. Because of their 
definitional intricacy and high intension, qualitative con-
cepts are designed to apply to only a small number of 
cases (Coppedge 1999). In contrast, the simpler defini-
tions and low intension involved in quantitative methods
are amenable to incorporating a much wider universe of 
cases for interrogation via statistical analysis. Qualitative 
methods tend to work with concepts that are closer to the 
maximal or ideal type definition and thus have few cases 
that fall within their domain, while quantitative methods 
work with minimal definition and thus have more expan-
sive domains (Gerring and Barresi 2003).
The concepts used in the qualitative and quantitative 
components of MMR may share a label or term, but they 
have different characteristics and refer to different cate-
gories of cases. This is depicted in Figure 1, where the 
horizontal axis lists four characteristics necessary for fall-
ing under the concepts rubric (A, B, C, and D) and the 
vertical axis lists the range of empirical cases that fall 
under it. In the figure, conceptual stretching is most obvi-
ously manifest at the level of extension: numerous cases 
that would be counted as “in” in a quantitative setting but 
“out” in a qualitative setting.
This form of conceptual stretching has severe implica-
tions for the ability to offer complementary accounts of 
correlation and mechanism. In some cases, the difference 
between qualitative and quantitative conceptualization 
may be so stark that the area of overlap is minimal or 
nonexistent. The terms themselves may be mere hom-
onyms. The qualitative and quantitative definitions of the 
concept are so disparate that they refer to entirely differ-
ent cases possessing entirely different attributes. Short of 
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conceptualizations.
such an egregious malpractice, though, it is still impor-
tant to disambiguiate between qualitative and quantita-
tive definitions of what purports to be the same concept. 
In fact, Gerring (2001, 65-85) goes so far as to suggest 
that we consider treating them as two distinctive concepts 
altogether. If they were expressed as a set, we could 
imagine qualitative and quantitatively construed concepts 
referring to two separate domains, X
qual
 and X
quant
, respec-
tively. These domains might overlap to a greater or lesser 
extent, but they are not congruent.
The situation becomes even more complex when we 
consider the difference in the kinds of techniques of con-
cept formation commonly practiced in qualitative and 
quantitative methods. As Goertz notes, though both qual-
itative and quantitative approaches to conceptualization 
can embed specific etiological properties into the defini-
tion of the concept itself, this is much more common in 
qualitative case study analysis. Identifying these proper-
ties is crucial to explicating the mechanisms by which 
causes produce their effects in particular instances 
(Goertz and Mazur 2008, 34; Goertz 2006, 64). In a nar-
rower (quantitative) conceptualization, however, these 
key attributes may not be included in the connotation, 
meaning many cases counted as “in” in the quantitative 
case domain do not share this attribute. A qualitative defi-
nition of a concept specifies four attributes: A, B, C, and 
D’. Attribute D’ is vital because it is the locus of causal 
potential. The quantitative definition, however, includes 
only attributes A and B.
Incongruence between conceptual definitions poses a 
significant problem for the division of labor in MMR. 
The quantitative portion identifies a regular correla-
tional pattern between antecedent X
quant
 and the out-
come, Y. Consideration of the specific causal 
mechanisms that are responsible for this correlation is 
left to the qualitative case study. If, however, the quali-
tative method defines its key concepts to include a 
causal property (D’) absent in some of the cases in the 
quantitative domain, then any claims to have identified 
both a correlational and causal pattern are bound to be 
underspecified. The qualitative component can make a 
claim about the mechanisms involved only in the domain 
of X
D’
, not the larger X
quant
. Stated differently, a signifi-
cant portion of the R2 observed in the statistical portion 
must have been the result of mechanisms other than the 
ones identified in the case study. It is even possible that 
the observed correlation is for the most part spurious 
and the only real causal relationship exists for the small 
subset of cases contained in X
D’
. This situation is shown 
graphically in Figure 2, where the covariation between 
X
quant
 and Y
quant
 is much larger than the covariation 
between X
D’
 and Y
D’
.
A good example of the problems of conceptual stretch-
ing and mechanism muddling comes from Lieberman’s 
(2003) Race and Regionalism in the Politics of Taxation 
in Brazil and South Africa. The puzzle Lieberman 
addresses is why states adopt more progressive redistrib-
utive tax regimes. The key variable, Lieberman argues, is 
a state’s national political community (NPC). NPC is a 
novel concept, which Lieberman defines as the official, 
state-sponsored definition of the nation specified in the 
constitution and other founding documents. NPC con-
strains the ability of political entrepreneurs to form coali-
tions to demand redistribution. As Lieberman describes 
the mechanism,
The specification of group rights in the form of 
official state documents and policies provides a 
stronger set of incentives for political entrepre-
neurs to make claims based on such identities. . . . 
Federalism, for example, tends to give important 
political salience to regional identities, and official 
racial exclusion tends to give much more salience 
to racial identities. (Lieberman 2003, 14)
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Table 1. Initial Typology of National Political Community by 
Type in Qualitative Analysis.
Federal Unitary
Race exclusionary South Africa
Race inclusionary Brazil  
Source: Lieberman (2003, 79).
Table 2. Distribution of Cases in Quantitative Analysis.
Federal Unitary
Fragmented Race exclusionary 3  4
 Race inclusionary 2 10
Not fragmented 7 43
Adapted from Lieberman (2003, 242)
When societies are divided by significant racial and 
regional heterogeneity, an officially sanctioned racial 
exclusion or federalist structure channels collective 
action into certain racial or regionalist forms.
Lieberman traces a surprising but persuasive historical 
account of this process using a paired comparison of 
Brazil and South Africa, two states with significant racial 
and regional disparities but different legal definitions of 
NPC. Brazil’s 1891 federalist constitution privileged 
claims based on regional equity but was explicitly inclu-
sive on racial grounds. Faced with a state that seemed 
intent on equalizing racial disparities, Brazil’s white eco-
nomic elite successfully worked to block demands for 
greater redistribution. In contrast, South Africa’s 1909 
Constitution specified white racial supremacy while 
denying recognition to regional differences. By establish-
ing whites as a formal legal category, this cornerstone 
legal document encouraged the white economic elite to 
cooperate with the state in establishing a social safety net 
system that raised the living standards of their poorer 
coethnics and increased the solidarity of the ruling white 
minority. After apartheid’s downfall, this redistributive 
regime was opened to all races, turning a tool of racial 
exclusion into one of socioeconomic equalization.
Following the case studies, Lieberman deploys large-N 
regression analyses to test whether the similar legal defi-
nitions of NPC along racial and regional dimensions have 
the same effect in other cases. Examining constitutions 
and other legal documents from other cases, he converts 
the data into a series of dummy variables that he enters on 
the left-hand side of the equation. The statistical results 
show a correlation consistent with the small-N study. 
When constitutions and other founding documents 
enshrine federalism, states tend to have less capacity for 
redistribution; when they enshrine racial supremacy, 
states have higher redistributive capacity.
But NPC, the crucial independent variable, is stretched 
severely in this effort to shift from a thick to a thin con-
ceptualization, muddling the claim to have linked corre-
lation with underlying causal mechanisms. The problems 
begin with the attempt to convert ontological categories 
of NPC into discrete dummy variables. The qualitatively 
derived elaboration of NPC proves too narrow to incor-
porate the majority of empirically relevant cases. As 
shown in Tables 1 and 2, South Africa and Brazil are rep-
resentative of only six of the sixty-nine cases (8.5 per-
cent) included in the quantitatively construed population. 
Only twenty-one countries (30.4 percent) in the quantita-
tively construed population share South Africa and 
Brazil’s racial fragmentation. In the population, forty-
three cases (62.3 percent) have neither relevant racial or 
regional cleavage. They essentially are outside the initial 
definition of NPC used in the qualitative narrative. In the 
quantitative analysis, Lieberman incorporates these cases 
by inventing a new category (“non-fragmented”), where 
racial divisions are not present. In so doing, however, 
Lieberman diminishes his ability to account for the mech-
anisms that connect antecedent to outcome in these cases. 
Based on historical investigation of Brazil and South 
Africa, the qualitatively derived version of NPC makes 
no mention of what constrains collective action in the 
absence of significant racial and regional cleavages. 
Overall, the study is mute about the disposition of the 
majority of the case it claims to explain.
While Lieberman’s resort to the residual category of 
“non-fragmented” to describe the NPC of the majority of 
this cases might be blamed on the relative novelty of the 
concept itself, the same problems of conceptual stretching 
and mechanism muddling also manifest in projects using 
relatively well-known and well-defined variables as well. 
In Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy, for instance, 
Schultz (2001) examines the impact of democracy on cri-
sis management and conflict resolution in light of demo-
cratic peace theory. The study begins by using POLITY 
scores to define a domain of some fifty-eight cases in 
which democracies faced challenges of deterrence and 
coding whether or not the opposition stood with the gov-
ernment during the crisis and whether the deterrence was 
a success. Through chi-squared and probit analyses, he 
demonstrates that success or failure is closely correlated 
with whether or not the democratic opposition sides with 
the government during a crisis.
Based on these statistical findings, Schultz uses case 
studies of the British in the Fashoda Crisis, the British in 
the Boer Wars, the British and French in the Rhineland 
Crisis, the British and French in the Suez Crisis, and the 
British during Rhodesian Independence to trace the way 
opposition behavior tips the government’s hand and 
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reveals information to foreign rivals about the level of 
determination in the crisis. He concludes that
whereas nondemocratic governments have sub-
stantial leeway to bluff and probe, democratic 
governments are less willing to make threats they 
do not intend to carry out. Underlying this probabi-
listic prediction is a specific causal mechanism: 
democratic governments face domestic competi-
tors who have an incentive to oppose the use of 
force when political and military conditions are 
unfavorable. (Schultz 2001, 233)
When the opposition supports the government, it lends 
credence to the national leadership’s claims of resolve in 
a crisis and chastens potential challengers. When the 
opposition stands apart from the government, it weakens 
the government’s credibility in a crisis.
Similar to the muddling mechanisms in Lieberman’s 
conceptualization of NPC, Schultz’s definition of democ-
racy becomes connotatively ambiguous as it travels 
between small and large-N. Transparency in foreign 
policy decision making—a key characteristic that the 
qualitative case studies identify as necessary to trigger 
the signaling mechanisms—is not a component of the 
POLITY-based quantitative definition of a democracy. 
Great Britain’s parliamentary system is renowned for 
vigorous and public debate on all manner of policy deci-
sions. But Great Britain was a party in only eighteen of 
the fifty-eight cases (31 percent) of democratic deter-
rence in the quantitative sample. A number of other 
factors can affect how a democratic opposition can mean-
ingfully signal to rival states during crisis, including, to 
name just a few, democracies headed by presidents rather 
than parliaments, different institutions of civil–military 
interactions, and different constellations of opposition 
forces at the time of crisis. In the United States, for 
instance, the concentration of foreign policy decision 
making in a relatively opaque and autonomous executive 
branch excludes the opposition from foreign policy 
debates and renders moot most signals that emanate from 
the legislative opposition. Democracies may be even less 
transparent in their foreign policy deliberations than 
authoritarian regimes.3 Even if Schultz’s claim about the 
mechanism is correct for Great Britain, it could not 
account for many of the other instances of crisis resolu-
tion within his initial quantitatively delimited domain.
Whether moving up the ladder of abstraction from 
qualitatively to a quantitatively construed concept or vice 
versa, MMR must contend with conceptual mismatch 
that leads to the muddling of mechanisms. Mechanism 
muddling damages the claim that nested analysis yields a 
more comprehensive, multidimensional causal account. 
This occurs because not all the cases within a large-N 
population share the properties necessary to activate a 
particular causal pathway specified in the qualitative 
domain. Mechanism muddling leads causal theories to be 
underspecified and imbalanced.
Conceptual Slippage
The disparities between qualitative and quantitative 
approaches to concepts are not limited to connotation 
and denotation. Rather, they extend to the use of differ-
ent schemas for measuring and categorizing cases. 
Qualitative measurement necessarily involves categoriz-
ing cases using specific nominal and ordinal criteria that 
often combine multiple dimensions or characteristics. 
Membership in each category is absolute, and each case 
is equivalent. By contrast, quantitative measurement 
involves scoring cases so that every case is related to the 
other on a basic interval or ratio scale.  Cases are mea-
sured along a single dimension (Mahoney 2000; Goertz 
2008). Because differing schemas imply a different set 
of relationships among referent cases, conceptual slip-
page can be seen as a form of measurement error where 
cases are inaccurately or inconsistently deemed equiva-
lent (or disparate) because of the discrepancies in taxo-
nomical systems (Franzosi 2004, 281; Jacoby 1999; 
Zerubavel 1996). Of course, this can occur in single-
method studies, sometimes as a result of sloppiness or 
the limitations of natural language (Bryman 1988, 127). 
Claiming simultaneously that two cases are equivalent 
members of a particular set and that one is “more” of 
that set than the other introduces significant ambiguity 
to the term and the measurement scale (Mahoney 2003). 
Such a combination of nominal and ordinal schemas 
requires considerable conceptual elaboration (Goertz 
2006, 82).
Slippage is a particularly acute problem for MMR 
because of the inherent disparity between qualitative and 
quantitative taxonomical schemas. Consider as examples 
the concepts of development and regime type. Quantitative 
research can make ready use of per capita GDP as a con-
tinuous variable to measure development. Since the vari-
able is expressed in interval format, quantitative research 
can tell that the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, and 
the United Arab Emirates are more or less equivalent 
(around $35,000 per capita GDP) and are five times more 
developed than Ukraine ($7,000). Qualitative research-
ers, in contrast, cannot make use of these kinds of fine-
tuned distinctions. Instead, they rely on a categorical set 
that treats certain degrees of difference as less relevant 
than others. Thus, Sweden, Denmark, and the United 
Kingdom might be grouped as “developed” economies, 
Ukraine as moderately developed. The United Arab 
Emirates, despite a high per capita GDP, might be 
grouped with the likes of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and 
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Venezuela in a special category of “highly developed 
rentier states.”4
On the other hand, democracy is a concept difficult to 
quantify because of its multidimensionality and manifest 
types and subtypes. Case-based researchers usually apply 
a proliferation of such classifications and typologies 
(Collier and Levitsky 1997). To gain greater specificity, 
qualitative researchers move down the ladder of abstract, 
adding features that differentiate cases from one another. 
The category of democracy is further specified by differ-
entiating parliamentary and presidential-type democra-
cies. Some conceptualizations of regime type are tailored 
to specific regions.5 On discovering a case too dissimilar 
to fit under the existing definitional rubric, the qualitative 
researcher will move up the ladder of abstraction to create 
a higher level category that subsumes the existing lower 
level. Thus, democracy becomes a type of political 
regime alongside authoritarianism and totalitarianism. 
These are not placed on a continuum, but each shares a 
variety of characteristics in common with each other 
(Linz 2000). By comparison, quantitative analysis relies 
on numerical datasets, such as Freedom House and 
POLITY, which treat democracy as a continuum. At best, 
these datasets reveal that two countries are equally demo-
cratic (or undemocratic). On quantitative scales, Iran is 
equivalent to Swaziland since both received Freedom 
House ratings of 6 for 2008. Even though the values are 
expressed in an interval format, there is no substantive 
meaning to the distance between intervals, such that the 
exact relationship between Iran (6) and North Korea (7) 
remains ambiguous (Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Hanson 
and Kopstein 2005).
When combining continuum and categorical scaling in 
MMR, significant conceptual slippage can occur. A 
good example comes from Lange’s (2009) Lineages of 
Despotism and Development. Lange hypothesizes that 
the difference between direct and indirect rule under the 
British empire lay the ground work for a path-dependent 
process of social, economic, and political development 
among postcolonial states. States that were directly gov-
erned by Britain inherited superior institutions that con-
tributed over time to superior attainment, while states that 
endured more indirect forms of control inherited less 
capable institutions and saw the empowerment of local 
strongmen that retarded development over time. Lange 
describes the differences between the ideal types of indi-
rect and direct colonial rule. Indirect rule involves col-
laboration between a dominant colonial center and several 
regionally based indigenous institutions. In contrast, 
direct rule entails the construction of a complete system 
of colonial domination in which both local and central 
institutions are well integrated and governed by the same 
authority and organizational principles. Lange (2009, 29) 
notes, however, that in practice the distinction between 
Table 3. Percentage of Cases in Customary Courts.
Colony
% of 
customary 
court cases Colony
% of 
customary 
court cases
Australia 0 Gambia 37
Bahamas 0 South Africa 39
Barbados 0 Zimbabwe 40
Belize 0 Botswana 43
Canada 0 India 49
Cyprus 0 Swaziland 49
Egypt 0 Bangladesh 50
Guyana 0 Lesotho 50
Hong Kong 0 Pakistan 50
Jamaica 0 Solomon Islands 52
Mauritius 0 Fiji 55
New Zealand 0 Kenya 59
Singapore 0 Zambia 60
Sri Lanka 0 Ghana 65
Trinidad 0 Sudan 73
United States 0 Tanzania 75
Brunei 1 Uganda 80
Malaysia 6 Sierra Leone 81
Myanmar 16 Malawi 82
 Nigeria 93
Source: Lange (2009, 48).
direct and indirect rule is “more of a spectrum than a 
strict dichotomy.” On one hand, there were only a hand-
ful of cases of completely integrated direct colonial rule. 
On the other hand, indirect rule never relied entirely on 
native collaboration. Instead, Lange reports, there were 
many cases of hybrid forms, such as Malaysia and India, 
“combining colonial and indigenous institutions in differ-
ent ways and to different extents.”
In his initial quantitative approach, Lange operational-
izes the form of control by measuring the percentage of 
court cases in each colony handled by indigenous courts 
based on customary law as opposed to colonial courts 
administered by the British. The larger the role played by 
customary courts, the less direct the form of colonialism. 
Using colonial historical records, Lange covers thirty-
nine cases (see Table 3). When added as an independent 
variable to a statistical equation of economic and social 
development, the results are consistent with the hypothe-
sis: countries that were subject to more direct forms of 
colonization have markedly better performance that those 
with less direct colonization in terms of per capita GDP, 
levels of democracy, average school attainment, and 
infant mortality.
Following the techniques of nesting analysis, Lange 
proceeds to select four cases for further in-depth interro-
gation: Mauritius, Botswana, Guyana, and Sierra Leone. 
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Table 4. Rubric for Qualitative Comparison.
Outcome 
(Y): Positive 
development
Outcome 
(Y): Negative 
development
Antecedent 
condition (X): 
Direct rule
Mauritius (0 
percent cases 
in customary 
courts)
Guyana (0 
percent cases 
in customary 
courts)
Antecedent 
condition (X): 
Indirect rule
Botswana (43 
percent of cases 
in customary 
courts)
Sierra Leone (81 
percent of cases 
in customary 
courts)
Source: Adapted from Lange (2009, 15).
He selects these cases with an eye to applying the logic of 
both most similar and most different designs, as shown in 
Table 4. The Mauritius–Botswana and Guyana–Sierra 
Leone comparisons are used to highlight determinants of 
similar outcomes. The Mauritius–Guyana and Botswana–
Sierra Leone comparisons are used to highlight determi-
nants of dissimilar outcomes.
Yet this qualitative structure betrays a change in the 
conceptualization of the key independent variable. Rather 
than being a matter of degrees between indirect and direct 
rule, as the concept had initially been treated in quantita-
tive analysis, in the qualitative portion colonial rule is 
treated as a simple bivariate. This switch implies some 
troubling logical claims: In this qualitative setting, 
Botswana is considered equivalent to Sierra Leone as an 
examples of indirect rule. In the quantitative setting, 
however, Botswana’s metric of indirect rule based on the 
prevalence of indigenous courts is only about half that of 
Sierra Leone. Moreover, the relationship between 
Botswana (43 percent) and cases such as Malaysia (6 per-
cent) and India (49 percent), which Lange had previously 
characterized as hybrid, is also ambiguous. The catego-
ries and scales by which Lange arrays his cases are inter-
nally inconsistent within the study. The units of analysis 
are not homogenous. At various points Lange has treated 
his key independent variable as a matter of degrees (as 
used in the quantitative component), a trichotomy (direct, 
hybrid, or indirect rule), or a dichotomy (as direct or indi-
rect rule). How the cases relate to one another analyti-
cally is unclear. Consequently, efforts to generalize from 
any specific cases to wider categories of cases becomes 
extremely problematic.
Similar to the effect of conceptual stretching, slippage 
leads to ambiguity in denotation of cases. Specifically, it 
affects the ways cases are related to one another and are 
located within a specific coding schema.  This violates 
the core assumption of unit homogeneity and equiva-
lence (Gerring 2007, 52). The problem is particularly 
dire, then, for MMR’s goal of mutual confirmation of 
results. If the cases selected for analysis via large-N and 
small-N are not equivalent, then the coincidental congru-
ence of findings in these two metrics is analytically 
inconsequential.
Addressing Concept Misformation: 
Standardization versus Flexibility?
The most intuitive way to address the problem of concept 
slippage is to push toward greater conceptual standard-
ization. Coppedge (1999, 2009) expresses hope that 
eventually the scholarly community might converge on 
definitions of key terms that are thick enough for use in 
case studies but thin enough to be applied on a large scale 
in statistical analyses:
As we climb the ladder of abstraction, we must 
leave behind the attributes that are irrelevant and 
take with us all the attributes that matter for the 
theory at hand. Unfortunately, knowing which 
attributes matter is hard. It requires round after 
round of theorizing and systematic testing. (Coppedge 
2009, 16)
Similarly, Lieberman (2005, 436) claims that nested 
analysis MMR can contribute to the progress of concept 
formation by systematically and iteratively juxtaposing 
the connotation and denotation of qualitative and quanti-
tative concepts, thereby forcing scholars to contend head 
on with the potential mismatch.
These measures face significant practical and theoreti-
cal obstacles, however. Dunning (2007) recommends that 
researchers familiarize themselves with variable features 
and underlying conceptual definitions in a data set by 
coding at least a handful of cases manually to recognize 
and rectify divergence between qualitative and quantita-
tive conceptualizations. Even before this labor-intensive 
inductive process begins, though, a more or less exhaus-
tive schema of conceptual subcategories and antonyms 
must be developed deductively to avoid shunting prob-
lematic cases into meaningless residual categories (Bailey 
1994, 17-34; Goertz 2006, 32-33).
Lange’s work, for instance, could have benefitted from 
a more thorough examination of the initial statistical data 
to develop a single, unified schema to measure the type of 
colonial control in both qualitative and quantitative 
domains. Instead of using incommensurate scalar and 
dichotomous variables, he might have offered a consistent 
conceptualization of colonization (such as the direct, 
hybrid, or indirect trichotomy) that establishes clear, con-
ceptually defensible cut points. He would have to offer a 
substantive explanation for whether Malaysia (6 percent 
cases in customary courts) should be considered closer 
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to directly colonized Guyana (0 percent) or indirectly 
colonized Myanmar (16 percent). Indicatively, some of the 
most promising efforts in this regard come through multi-
scholar collaborative projects, such as the Research 
Network on Gender Politics and the State (McBride and 
Mazur 2010) and the World Bank’s project on the causes 
of civil wars (Sambanis 2004a, 2004b).
Standardizing concepts, however, does not address the 
question of mechanism muddling, which is essentially a 
problem of equifinality and multiple pathways leading to 
the same outcome. While statistical analysis often over-
looks the phenomenon, it is a critical component in effec-
tive qualitative research (Mahoney and Goertz 2006; 
Bennett and Elman 2006; Braumoeller 2003). In the cases 
of Lieberman and Schultz discussed above, the problem is 
not that the mechanisms are specified inaccurately but that 
they were logically insufficient to account for the regular-
ity across all the cases in the set because of the concept of 
misformation. In other words, a significant portion of the 
correlation observed in the statistical portion must have 
been from mechanisms other than the ones identified in the 
case studies.
Considerable conceptual elaboration is necessary to 
enable the search for potentially manifest but equifinite 
mechanistic pathways. Conceptual definitions must be 
made more flexible to capture the variety of the referent 
cases and reflect a range of embedded causal proper-
ties. Just as was the case for conceptual standardiza-
tion, concept formation must be wary of creating 
residual categories that have little analytical purchase. 
Rather than trying to simplify categorization schemas, 
though, the likely outcome is a proliferation of sub-
types and the creation of an even more intricate concep-
tual hierarchy.6
Returning to the example of Lieberman, while the 
factors of race and regionalism identified in the case 
studies of South Africa and Brazil may have had a sig-
nificant impact in defining NPC and in turn spurring the 
creation of more or less robust welfare states, these 
mechanisms cannot account for the majority of the cases 
where formally specified regions and racial cleavages 
are both absent. A more flexible conceptual format 
would suggest other forms of NPC that could have a 
similar impact. For instance, the experience of war and 
mass mobilization could redefine boundaries of citizen-
ship and national belonging in much the same way that 
Lieberman claims racial or regional cleavages do. In 
fact, a number of studies show that when NPC is defined 
by war, citizens often demand redistributive fiscal and 
tax policies (Centeno 2003; Skocpol 1995). This third 
NPC subtype could be examined qualitatively to identify 
another mechanism that accounts for the emergence of 
progressive (or regressive) fiscal and tax policies in a 
wider span of relevant cases.
Similarly, in the example of Schultz, recognizing 
diversity within democratic states rather than relying on 
Great Britain as a prototype would prompt further quali-
tative research to explain peaceful conflict resolution 
when transparent foreign policy decision making is 
absent. In such opaque democracies, it is possible that a 
perception of shared liberal values causes them to adopt a 
more conciliatory attitude toward democratic rivals 
(Hayes 2009). In MMR’s aim for comprehensive causal 
accounts, these alternative mechanisms constitute not 
rival hypotheses but complementary efforts that offer a 
more inclusive delineation of the pathways that undergird 
correlative relationships. To recognize these potential 
mechanisms, however, concepts must be built that cover 
the range of empirical variation within the relevant cases.
Pursuing the goals of concept standardization and 
flexibility pulls the MMR practitioner in two different 
directions. On one hand, standardization leads MMR 
closer to mimicking the techniques of quantitative analy-
sis. Standardization, after all, ensures there is unit homo-
geneity between qualitative and quantitative components 
and that there is no measurement error or discrepancies 
between the two. On the other hand, flexibility fosters the 
recognition of multiple causal pathways by proliferating 
an array of conceptual subtypes. This is more in line with 
the techniques of contextualized comparisons of seem-
ingly disparate cases commonly deployed in qualitative 
analysis (Locke and Thelen 1995). These steps, though, 
make it harder to fit cases into a statistical format because 
of the numerous forms and permutations of case catego-
rizations. Reversing the logic of “thickening” thin con-
cepts, some concepts are already too thick to be easily 
converted into statistical format. Ultimately, MMR prac-
titioners are likely to be drawn toward whichever pole 
they deem adds greater analytical value, sacrificing the 
other component of the study.
Conclusion
No conceptual definition is written in stone. Any mean-
ingful comparative method depends ultimately on push-
ing concepts to new and unfamiliar historical, geographic, 
or theoretical terrain. In this manner, unfounded (and 
often unstated) assumptions about a particular concept’s 
applicable scope are challenged empirically and the con-
cept’s essential components are uncovered and made 
more explicit (C. Chen and Sil 2007). Indeed, among the 
promises of MMR is that it can integrate qualitatively 
derived, region-specific knowledge with larger cross-
national, quantitative analysis in a new form of compara-
tive area studies (Ahram 2010).
Still, Sartori’s warnings about conceptual misforma-
tion stand as a reminder that transparency and consistency 
in refining concepts are also critical. Otherwise, the search 
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016prq.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Ahram 289
for generality in application is liable to yield concepts so 
distorted as to be meaningless. This challenge is signifi-
cantly magnified for MMR and thus requires more proac-
tive efforts to head off problems associated with concept 
misformation. As summarized in Table 5, different forms 
of concept misformation undermine different aspects of 
MMR’s claim to improve social science research overall. 
The goal of producing multidimensional accounts of both 
correlative patterns and mechanistic causal pathways is 
damaged by mechanism muddling. If different causal 
properties are implicit in different conceptual definitions, 
then any causal pathway that is identified through qualita-
tive inquiry is bound to be underspecified relative to the 
broad correlation identified in the quantitative setting. 
The goal of mutual validation between qualitative and 
quantitative methods is damaged by conceptual slippage. 
If qualitative and quantitative methods work with differ-
ent schemas to categorize cases, then the relationship 
between cases is inconsistent, making it impossible to 
generalize about groups of cases.
There is no easy fix to these twin problems, and 
addressing one may well exacerbate the other. On one 
hand, concept standardization confronts slippage. It 
ensures that units are homogeneous, a key assumption in 
quantitative analysis. On the other hand, greater concep-
tual flexibility is often necessary to capture multiple 
mechanistic pathways in qualitative analysis. Ultimately, 
MMR confronts the same dilemma as single method 
qualitative and quantitative studies, forced to choose 
between depth and breadth of findings.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with 
respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this 
article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, 
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Notes
1. See Goertz (2008), Collier and Mahon (1993), and Adcock 
and Collier (2001).
2. Also see X. Chen (1990).
3. On different subtypes of democracy and foreign policy, see 
Peterson (1996), Elman (2000), and Palmer, London, and 
Regan (2004).
4. For an extended discussion of categorization schemes, see 
Ragin (2000). For an example of a perfunctory attempt to 
justify excluding oil-producing states from the study of 
development, see Przeworski et al. (2000).
5. See Bratton and Van de Walle (1994) on African regime 
types.
6. For a good example of such an elaborate conceptualization, 
see Møller and Skaaning (2010).
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